

full article

The Role of Far-Right Networks in the Cultural War and International Relations in Europe

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Abstract: The author analyzes the internationalization of European far right civil societies as non-traditional political actors that engage in international relations creating ideological networks. The purpose of the article is to reveal the role of European fascist civil societies in international ideological activism as a response to a perceived cultural war against globalism and cultural Marxism of left internationalists. The article analyzes and comprehensively defines the issue of the cultural war in the West and describes the characteristics of Spanish fascist civil societies as non-traditional political actors exposing their perspective as cultural war revolutionaries. Attempts to create international far right networks by Spanish actors are studied based on the analysis of *The Militant – The Cultural War*, the manifesto published by the Spanish fascist civil society European Future in February 2023. A discourse analysis of this document exposes the ideological narratives of this group that can help to create a theoretical framework of the cultural war concept for European far right politics. The results demonstrate that European far right activists consider there is an ideological war against Marxists and other leftist groups. Activists of the European Future see themselves as far right revolutionaries capable of causing an ideological revolution in European democracies. The manifesto serves as a tool to call out to other European far right activists of the continent to join them. The results can contribute to future research of ideological extremism and European far right activism.

Keywords: civil society, cultural war, far right, fascist ideology, information warfare, internationalism, political extremism, woke ideology

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оригинальная статья

Роль сетей крайне правых в культурной войне и международных отношениях в Европе

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Аннотация: Автор анализирует интернационализацию европейских крайне правых гражданских обществ в качестве неконвенциональных политических акторов, которые вступают в международные отношения для создания идеологических сетей. Цель – разоблачить роль фашистских европейских ультраправых гражданских обществ в интернационалистской идеологической активности как ответ на предполагаемую культурную войну против глобализма и интернационалистского культурного марксизма левых. Проблема культурной войны на Западе анализируется и определяется с более широкой точки зрения. Описываются характеристики испанских фашистских гражданских обществ как неконвенциональных политических акторов с целью раскрыть их позицию революционеров культурной войны. Попытки испанских акторов создать международные крайне правые сети рассматриваются на основе изучения манифеста «Милитант – культурная война», опубликованного испанским фашистским гражданским обществом «Европейское будущее»

в феврале 2023 г. Дискурс-анализ выявляет различные идеологические нарративы данной группы, которые можно использовать для построения теоретической основы понимания значения культурной войны для европейских крайне правых. Результаты показывают, что европейские крайне правые считают, что идет идеологическая война против марксистов и других левых групп. Активисты «Европейского будущего» считают себя крайне правыми революционерами, способными совершить идеологическую революцию в европейских демократиях, и их манифест служит инструментом для призыва других европейских крайне правых активистов на континенте присоединиться к ним. Результаты могут внести вклад в будущие исследования идеологического экстремизма и европейского крайне правого активизма.

Ключевые слова: гражданское общество, культурная война, крайне правые, фашистская идеология, информационная война, интернационализм, политический экстремизм, воук идеология

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Introduction

In the last decade the national politics of some European societies experienced a dramatic turn to the far right. The change was caused by different events beginning with the 2008 economic crisis and ending with the emergence of political and social movements influenced by the D. Trump presidency of 2016. However, European far right political parties had been gaining seats at the European Parliament since the beginning of the XXI c. These political parties did not take the extreme measures expected by the voters against what was perceived by some as the loss of European identity to non-Christian immigrants, economic insecurity, and an apparent expansion of the government. Due to these factors the ultra conservatives reacted against the political establishment of all ideologies supporting a provocative discourse that encourages nationalism and a Eurocentric view of the world – Christian, capitalist and dominated by ethnic Europeans.

These far right forces are made up of non-traditional political actors (NTPA), some of which reacted to the failures of traditional politicians by creating civil societies that form networks and internationalize their far right agenda in Europe and the American continent. The influence and actions of civil societies are not limited to national issues anymore thanks to social media and new technologies that allow to share content that can influence societies and politics of different languages and political traditions.

Some of the far right European civil societies have embraced fascist identities to achieve their national and international political agendas as a reaction to what they consider a cultural war against international progressive and authoritarian left forces. The article argues that such fascisized civil societies (FCS) use 2 approaches: 1) theoretical – contributing to the normalization of fascist ideology through different channels

of communication in what they perceive as a cultural war against leftist activists and politicians, 2) practical – creating networks to engage in international relations with other fascisized civil societies in Europe and organize street demonstrations to celebrate dates relevant to European fascism.

The aim of the research is to expose the role of European far right civil societies (subjects of research), in this case those that have embraced fascism, in internationalist ideological activism in the continent through their networks as a response to a perceived cultural war against globalism and internationalist cultural Marxism of the left. The study was conducted with the hypothesis that European FCS aim to create networks to internationalize their ideology in the continent through non-traditional political means forming non-traditional international networks. The research tries to determine the characteristics of the cultural war against the left based on the perception of some European FCS. To achieve this, the author performs a discourse analysis of the online manifesto *The Militant – The Cultural war* (the object of research), written by the ideologues of the FCS *European Future* (*Devenir Europeo*) published in February 2023 on the web. The novelty of the work lies in the contribution to the study of the European far right internationalization through the actions of the organized civil societies of NTPAs, and the fact that this is the first academic study of the manifesto published by the Spanish FCS *European Future*.

Far right civil societies can organize ideological movements to attract voters for nationalist political parties, as did the Civic Circles Movement in Hungary in the early 2000, that helped the far right Fidesz party change the ideological hegemony of the left and eventually gain power [1, p. 249–258]. Other extremist NTPAs organized and created the far right civil societies

that were able to mobilize ideologized masses responding to their calls, like PEGIDA that has falsified German history and politics to present modern Germany as a leftist dictatorship that oppresses the far right dissent and criticism against the left [2, p. 3–10]. Other far right civil societies use their political influence to mobilize sectors of society against international political projects of their country. Such was the case in 2012–2019, when in France the far right civil societies The Identitarians, The Demonstration for All and Civitas Institute protested online and in the streets against the French membership in the European Union [3, p. 200–210].

The case of European Future is different from the Hungarian, German, and French ones, as this Spanish FCS is not only far right, but it has embraced an openly fascist identity using discursive elements of that ideology, as well as visual materials. This is done both online and in the streets of Spain, and every year this FCS participates in events where it invites other fascist NTPAs from Europe to expand or strengthen their ideological networks.

The internationalist activism of some European far right NTPAs like the ones mentioned above and others is the reaction to the perceived cultural war against the left and the globalism represented by socialist and communist politicians and political parties, international corporations and the industry of entertainment (Disney and Netflix), media and international organizations. All of these actors are perceived as participants in the spread of the American-influenced leftist "woke" ideology aimed at destroying the European national identities and orchestrated by secret elites.

In Russia, there is little research of the concept of the cultural war due to the fact that this phenomenon is not present in Russian society, while it is often observed in the West. However, it has been argued that the social and political events of 1990–2000 were the result of the cultural war against Russia waged after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. This war was non-traditional, rather, cultural, sociological and philosophical, waged without arms and against the established nation's culture [4, p. 61–65]. The goal of the cultural war against post-socialist Russia of the 1990s was the destruction of Soviet and Russian culture to lay the foundations of the neoliberal system organized by national elites in the interests of foreign capitalism.

The cultural war can also be understood as some type of "Kulturkampf" or the fight between two conflicting sets of cultural meanings and values that is different from the fight between states of different imagined and generalized cultures (like between Western, Christian

Orthodox, Islamic) [5, p. 46–48]. The cultural war implies a deep division in the society affected by it within the same state, it is the fight between two equally extreme sides – orthodox and progressive, it is the war of groups with different cultural ideas obstructing any attempts to find a common ground in relevant social issues [6, p. 1–12]. The cultural war is "the social cleavage" between the "traditional conservative" and the "liberal progressive" [7, p. 1407–1411]. From an American perspective, race, ethnicity, and religion are at the center of the war between the left and the right, it is the call for a "clash of civilizations" between the Christian West and the Islamic or non-Christian East [8, p. 314–317], though it is a simplistic approach to the issue. The cultural war can also be studied as the strategy to homogenize opinions, values, beliefs, trends, and representations using "the cultural and ideological apparatus" that can be the industry of entertainment at the service of dissident groups or foreign ideologies that aim at changing the mentality of their targets in society to alter the ideological hegemony for their benefit¹.

The cultural war can then be understood as the philosophical and ideological political conflict that can be waged internally within one state in which its members have opposite perceptions of how politics must be conducted, but it can also be waged against other states. Participants can use various tools to spread their ideology, like written and visual physical materials (books, fliers, public demonstrations) or digital non-physical ones (manifestos, photos, videos and memes). Today, the latter are more common as social media platforms facilitate the spread of ideological propaganda.

Foreign actors with economic or political interests in the conflict can participate in the cultural war. Members of the opposite parties fight for ideological supremacy to achieve political changes that would end the hegemony of the ideological dominant group. The cultural war can be influenced 1) directly by foreign elites (politicians, non-governmental organizations, mass and social media) whose interests lie in the change of hegemony of the targeted state, and 2) indirectly by the adoption of foreign ideologies in the society that consciously decides to adopt them, sometimes unconsciously by consuming ideological entertainment or contacting with ideologized individuals.

A. Gramsci theorized that two strategies can be used to achieve the change of the hegemonic system: 1) a war of movement – the takeover of the State by the organized opposition led by a party or individual, or 2) a war of position – the attempt to change the ideological system by winning the minds of the governed who will then swiftly support the change [9, p. 165]. A. Gramsci

¹ Heredia Martínez F. Los símbolos nacionales y la guerra cultural. [National symbols and the culture war. (In Spanish)]. *Cubadebate*. URL: <http://www.cubadebate.cu/especiales/2016/09/27/los-simbolos-nacionales-y-la-guerra-cultural/> (accessed 4 Apr 2023).

considered that "ideological struggle is needed to achieve hegemony" [10, p. 156], therefore, the cultural war is a type of war of position against the hegemonic political actor(s). For many European far right NTPAs and FCS, the hegemonic political actor to fight is the politician or a political ruling party that embraces American culture, "wokeism", cultural Marxism, secularism, feminism, and multiculturalism. Ideological dissidents who participate in the cultural war against the European left see themselves as revolutionaries for their perceived opposition to the hegemonic ideological order.

European far right civil societies become FCS when they adopt extremist ideological positions and goals to "intentionally destroy completely or partly any national, ethnic, racial or religious group" [11, p. 50], when they aim at physically destroying their opponents, or when their principles value ethnic supremacy, state corporatism and justified social and economic disparities [12, p. 57–59]. Ideological characteristics of European FCS include: 1) creation of ethno-states in Europe, where political elites are ethnic European, and they have the power to shape society based on what they consider is the image of the true European and true European values, 2) ban of all immigration from Africa and the Middle East as this is an existential threat for Christian Europe, 3) Marxism, socialism and communism are ideological enemies as they enable the destruction of the European social, political and economic order.

The studies on international terrorist attacks, carried out by far right terrorists, have explored the actions and plans of presumed lone actors, concluding that the number of casualties increases when the attacks are carried out by groups [13, p. 113], and that perpetrators are influenced by those around them in the physical and digital world or by the literature they read [14, p. 799–807]. This presents the possibility that creating networks of ideological and material support is important in the final goals of these extremists. FCS, as well as other NTPAs that create global networks through strategic cooperation inspired by ideological principles with the intention to compete for leadership in those societies represent a higher threat to security than those in the far right who may act alone [15, p. 50–54].

Networks help in the transmission of extremist political ideologies as they serve as channels to share knowledge and experience to others already engaged or reach out to those who may be interested in the ideology and make them participants [16, p. 7–8]. Such was the case of the online forum the Fascist Forge that until 2020 shared fascist and white supremacist ideology

[17, p. 217–231]. Iron March, another popular fascist website, created an online network of international fascism mostly for Western activists, was ironically founded by an ethnic Uzbek student living in Moscow who used the name Alexander Slavros, to spread fascist propaganda. He ran the site until it was shut down in 2017. The Internet influences the radicalization of individuals as it facilitates it. However, the offline environment is also relevant, as it creates the conditions for individuals to engage with those they think they share ideological interests online and then become members of such networks [18]. The Internet can complement the radicalization process and contribute to the radicalization of others.

The creation of networks using modern technologies like social media platforms and websites is a strategy in the internationalization of modern European fascism that serves to organize protests, create and disseminate the content, share hyperlinks to advance the ideology and build alliances with other FCS and NTPAs [19, p. 3–17]. NTPAs and political parties of the far right use Twitter² to spread their ideology to national and international audiences [20, p. 515–530]. This platform is used to construct the politicized European identity and the discourse about the undesired non-European other [21, p. 716–727], who can be Muslim, immigrant, communist or, more recently, Russian. Platforms like Twitter allow the use of images and memes as tools to construct the undesired non-European other, create propaganda and online communities [22, p. 2484–2497]. These tools can also serve to recruit new members either nationally to physically attend events, or internationally to follow the NTPAs ideological network from abroad. The FCS European Future is active on Twitter, as well as on Telegram; the latter has not been sufficiently studied as a tool for propaganda of European FCS and other far right NTPAs.

Digital support can also be financial as money can flow between these NTPAs to sponsor their activism. Unlike Fascist Forge and Iron March that were not established FCS, but rather by the networks of online activism for NTPAs, European Future is an established FCS that runs an officially registered website that serves as a channel to spread a fascist ideology with other NTPAs, making this case more interesting to researchers.

Methods and materials

The article studies the online activism of the FCS European Future. This FCS was founded in 2007 in Barcelona by the neonazi Ramon Bau Fraera, one of the main ideologues of neo-nazism in Spain. This FCS also

² In March 2022, Twitter was blocked on the territory of the Russian Federation based on the decision of the Office of the Procurator General of the Russian Federation dated February 24, 2022. В марте 2022 г. Twitter был заблокирован на территории РФ на основании решения Генеральной прокуратуры РФ от 24 февраля 2022 г.

publishes its own books and journals [23, p. 212–214]. European Future is officially registered in the Spanish National Registry of Associations of the Ministry of Interior, which allows the group to receive money donations. In February 2023 European Future published *The Militant*, the nine pages manifesto intended to serve as the main ideological source of inspiration for its members and other far right NTPAs. The manifesto has nine pages with three main sections: a) What is the cultural war? b) The militant: Manual for the formation of the cultural war, and c) Forward to Europe. In section b there are four subsections: b.1) The New Man, b.2) The Silenced History, b.3) Makers of History, b.4) Revolutionary Politics.

The discourse analysis of the manifesto will be aimed at searching for keywords of three groups. The first group represents characteristics of the European far right and fascist ideologies: *nation, national(ist), people, Marxism, communism, socialism, national-socialism (NS), tradition, history / historic, values, our, power, Hitler, Goebbels, Volkssturm*. The second group of keywords contains characteristics of the discourse of the cultural war: *woke* (progre in Spanish), *revolution(ary), left(ist), battle, culture, Europe, West, civilization, ideology, worldview*. The third group of keywords describes NTPAs who are reading or taking action for the goals of the Spanish or European fascist movement: *heroes, militant*. The manifesto is in Spanish, the keywords have been translated. The Spanish keywords *battle* and *war* are both used in the phrase *cultural war*, so in the article both keywords represent the same meaning. In the manifesto the author prefers to use *battle* instead of *war*. The frequency of each keyword was calculated as a percentage in the total word count of the document (3,223). The results of the discourse analysis will present various narratives of this FCS in understanding of its cultural war ideologues.

Results

The keyword analysis shows the following distribution (times mentioned, percentage in the total word count). The first group – *nation / communism / socialism / tradition* (0; 0%), *nationalist* (1; 0.03%), *people* (13; 0.40%), *Marxism* (4; 0.12%), *national-socialism (NS)* (5; 0.15%), *history / historic* (16; 0.49%), *values* (9; 0.27%), *our* (32; 0.99%), *power* (7; 0.21%), *Hitler / Goebbels* (1; 0.03%), *Volkssturm* (2; 0.06%). The second group – *woke* (3; 0.09%), *revolution(ary)* (8; 0.24%), *leftist* (2; 0.06%), *battle* (17; 0.52%), *culture / cultural* (49; 1.52%), *Europe(an)* (24; 0.74%), *West / civilization* (3; 0.09%), *ideology* (4; 0.12%), *worldview* (7; 0.21%). The third group – *heroes* (7; 0.21%), *militant* (17; 0.52%).

In the first group the words *our* (32; 0.99%), *history / historic* (16; 0.49%) and *people* (13; 0.40%)

represent the highest relevance for the ideologue of European Future who wrote the manifesto, Pablo Saez Pardo. The 32 mentions of the word *our* can be broken down into the following combinations: *our people(s)* (5; 15.62%), *our culture / our battle / our fighting* (2; 6.25%). The following keywords are found only in the combination with *our*: *civilization / ideal / movement / power / country / goals / efforts / worldview / ideology / vision / history / identity / pages / reality / era / hands / values / ethos / volkssturm / eyes* (1; 3.12%). It is interesting that with the combination *our people(s)* the author does not specifically mean Spain, throughout the text he makes it clear that he talks about Europe and the imagined geographical West as one and the same civilization. This can be confirmed by the lack of the *Spain / Spanish* keyword and the presence of the combinations *our culture, our history, our identity* and *our civilization*. Though, the author does mention *our country*, and as the document is written in Spanish and is to be read by European Spanish speakers, it could be assumed he writes about Spain. However, the mentioned combinations suggest that he tries to create a sense of internationalism that links Spanish fascist history with that of other European societies, especially German, as he uses the term *Volkssturm*. *Volkssturm* was the term used by German nationalists of the Third Reich comparable to the term *race*. So, when he uses the combination *our Volkssturm* he is definitely writing about some imagined European race, similar to the German fascist concept of an Aryan race. In the other mention of the keyword *Volkssturm*, the author wrote "the ethos and the volkssturm that define the essence of our civilization", where he defines the cultural war and its aim to defend what he considers the European culture and an ethnic civilization. The only two mentions of Hitler and Goebbels in the document describe the moment when the latter disobeyed the former and decided to stay in Berlin as the Red Army approached; this decisiveness is something the author thinks should be a part of the every fascist militant's character today.

From the second group three keywords are present more than 0.40% in the document: *culture/cultural* (49; 1.52%), *Europe(an)* (24; 0.74%) and *battle* (17; 0.52%). Out of 49 mentions of culture, 17 are in a combination with the keyword *battle* (34.69%), followed by *culture* as a substantive (the culture, a culture) – (11; 22.44%), *European culture(s)* (5; 10.20%), *our culture / cultural dissolution* (2; 4.08%), *cultural + production / works / struggle / flag / differences / diversity / disintegration / rot / formation / fighter / identity / artistic-cultural production* (1; 2.04%). For the author, culture is both material and non-material, the former is everything that has ever been created by what he considers the Western European civilization, and the latter is the spiritual identity formed

by the interaction of the peoples that inhabit Europe and fill it with their unique ethnic interpretations. Based on his perception, this spiritual identity is threatened by non- and anti-Europeans. The keyword *Europe(an)* has some interesting combinations: *Europe* as a substantive – (9; 37.5%), *European culture* (5; 20.83%), *European + revolutionaries / framework / civilization / revolution / resistance / idiosyncrasy* (1; 4.16%), *non-European communities* (1; 4.16%), *revolutionary youth, genuinely European / anti-European historiography / Europeanist* (1; 4.16%). The author defines Europe as a cultural region that belongs to a specific supra-ethnic group without historical or ethnic differences, all Europeans share values, artworks, beliefs that must be defended from degradation and dissolution that can disintegrate a big European nation. In the author's view, this disintegration is promoted by capitalism, Marxism, "woke" leftists and Jews. The keyword *battle* is 17 times combined with the keyword with the keyword *culture / cultural* making it the only combination of those analyzed with 100% correlation. This combination describes the characteristics of the cultural war that should be effective, guarantee the existence of the idealized Europe for the future, and should have educated fascist militants.

In the third group, only the keyword *militant* is mentioned over 0.40%, which is understandable since this document is explicitly intended to be read by other fascist activists involved in the movement who might look for directions. This keyword is used as: *the / each / a militant* (12; 70.58%), *militant base* (2; 11.76%), *militant core / youth / formation* (1; 5.88%). The results show that the description of the FCS militant sympathizer is the second most important word in the document after the cultural war. There are some secondary keywords that are the most common in section b: *political* (15; 0.46%), *formation* (8; 0.24%), *members / ideas / ideals* (4; 0.12%), *thinking* (3; 0.09%). These secondary keywords express the requirement for the fascist revolutionary militant to properly develop political ideas and ideals that create the correct ideological thinking. The second keyword of this group, *heroes*, is used six times to describe the historical heroes, in most cases forgotten, to be praised by Europeans; one time the keyword is used to criticize the modern Hollywood artists praised as role models by some in the West.

Additionally, in each section of the document there are main goals that can be identified:

1. *Section a* – the author considers the fact that the cultural war has two directions: 1) internal – aimed at ideologized activists within the fascist far right to secure a total implementation of their political plan, 2) external – aimed at completing a total hegemonic change through what the author considers the European revolution to transform societies in the continent.

2. *Section b* – manual for the cultural war formation – aimed at inspiring activists to get educated and educate others in the ideology to win the cultural war. Education should be focused on national-socialist ideology, European culture and history from a Eurocentric standpoint in which Europe is the source of unprecedented knowledge and evolution. Fascist activists should also be educated in the history of their national heroes, including fascist dictators like Francisco Franco and Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera. This will contribute to the fascist revolution and will eventually save Spain and Europe from destruction.

3. *Section c* – calls the readers to become fascist militants and join the fight against the European left to resist changes and the supposed destruction of the idealized Europe to defend the "Volkssturm".

There is the author's philosophical contradiction as in *section a* he states that Europe should be defined by a European culture, not by historical circumstances. Then in *section b* he mentions that the circumstances for the ideological revolution of the far right in society do not exist. Later in *section c* he writes that the circumstances of the nation and the historical moment would allow the ideological revolution. For the author, the circumstances of Europeans can shape the fascist revolution, but they cannot shape Europe as this is not only a geographical region by his primordialist understanding. For the author, Europe is a geographical region inhabited by ethnic indigenous Europeans, which leaves many questions, like *what is the place of countries like Russia and Turkey in this idealized Europe?* unanswered.

Conclusion

The discourse analysis of the The Militant – The Cultural War manifesto identified the following narratives:

- for the FCS European Future, Europe is an idealized region that can only be socially constructed by ethnic Europeans;
- European history, people, and culture have to be defended by an active ideologized fascist militant from a perceived Marxist and liberal international order that threatens the existence of the idealized Europe;
- the cultural war has to be won by the far right to guarantee the future of Europe;
- the FCS European Future sees German historical national-socialism and its leaders as historical ideological references that are valid and need to be followed in today's reality.
- fascist European militants are needed to participate in the cultural war and educate others on the ideology.
- the cultural war is required to cause a hegemonic change to the right, retake control from leftist forces, and establish far right extremist governments that will protect the ethnic composition of the idealized Europe.

This manifesto is intended to create an internationalist network of Spanish far right fascist activists who will engage with other European FCS for the consolidation of the idealized Europe. The document aims to define the cultural war from the perspective of an FCS that perceives itself as an active participant of this event. For European Future, the cultural war in the European context of ethno-nationalist / fascist militants against the left has the following characteristics: 1) it is an ideological dichotomy between the European and the non-European, in which the former is the revolutionary reaction to the latter that is an American interventionist "woke" ideology, 2) "woke" or progressive ideology questions the established social order that limits the development in society and is toxic to the idealized Europe, 3) reactionary nationalism tries to protect traditional idealized European values from the "woke" deconstruction of society in the cultural war.

These characteristics show that the cultural war is, indeed, an ideological war between the left and the right. It was shaped by the philosophical and ideological conflicts of the Cold War that survived to our days. The difference is the role of social media, new technologies, and propaganda in the spread of information and disinformation. The role of Telegram in the creation of NTPAs like European Future, including the other FCS like FACTA and Rincón Hispánico (which organizes public lectures and publishes books of Nazi content in Madrid), should also be studied in depth in future research, as this can provide more details into the organization capabilities these NTPAs have. European Future has 2,170 subscribers in Telegram and has posted 2,595 photos and 84 videos of propagandistic content as of the day this work was written.

It could be argued that FCS are not numerous or that their online activities are limited to their internal ideological audiences, but in our hyper connected reality Spanish FCS and other far right NTPAs can

easily engage in communication with others in their ideological line in other European countries. Getafe Nacional Revolucionario, another Spanish FCS, shared a video on Twitter on March 5th, 2022. The video showed material support sent by the FCS to Ukrainian nationalists. A photo twitted on March 1st, 2022 by European Future shows a demonstration in support of the 36th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS with a banner in Ukrainian that reads *My honor is loyalty*, likely to have taken place in Madrid. Future research can also focus on the physical and digital visual propaganda materials used by these Spanish FCS, some of which are available at the mentioned social media platforms helping them reach and engage other far right NTPAs in the continent. The propagandistic ideological content used by European far right NTPAs in the cultural war includes the known political symbols like Nazi swastikas or the Schutzstaffel, as well as other more specific ones like the Othala, the Sonnerand or Odin's Cross.

It should be primordial for European states to limit the possibilities of the far right NTPAs and FCS that engage in an ideological extremism to participate in the perceived cultural war as nationalist revolutionaries who aim to cause a hegemonic change to the extreme right. Such efforts must include the international cooperation as the European NTPAs and FCS have internationalized and threaten the social stability of European societies, including Russia, for being perceived as the historical enemy of European fascism.

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